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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FLANDERS & ASSOCIATES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
R. DUANE LAYTON, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 960090-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM ORDER STRIKING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND 
JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT OF THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, Circuit Court Judge 
Flanders & Associates ("F & A") , appellant herein, 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the determination of 
the Third Circuit Court, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod 
presiding, and provides its Reply Brief, as follows: 
ARGUMENT I 
F & A IS ENTITLED TO ASSERT 
THE PROTECTIONS OF RULE 60(b) 
Essentially, the Brief of Appellee summarily asserts that 
because F & A is a law firm, it cannot make a mistake that is 
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excusable under the eyes of the law, which mistake would support a 
setting aside of a default judgment. Mr. Layton explains that 
attorneys are not allowed to make excusable mistakes because "the 
attorney and the litigant are one in the same and no inequity or 
injustice results". Page 11, Brief of Appellee. There is no legal 
authority to support this contention. It is true that sometimes a 
Court will not reverse a sanction that has occurred due to an 
attorneys failure, because the client has a remedy, i.e. the client 
can pursue the responsibility of the attorney. This, however, does 
not render Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, ineffective 
or inapplicable when an attorney makes a mistake. In numberless 
cases, Courts have set aside judgments that were entered due to 
attorney's mistakes. Rule 60(b) does not exclude lawyers from its 
coverage. The rule was enacted to protect people from mistakes 
that can happen, mistakes that should be excused because everyone, 
including attorneys, makes mistakes no matter how hard they try to 
ivoid them. 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order or 
proceeding for the following reasons; (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (5) 
the judgment is void; . . . or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
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Clearly, Rule 60(b) is not intended only for the use of non-lawyers 
who do or do not have attorneys representing them. Unfortunately, 
even attorneys make mistakes; mistakes that should be forgiven. 
In this case, a client, who had been a long-term friend, 
requested the firm's services. Services were provided as is 
demonstrated in the principal Brief filed by F & A. Mr. Layton was 
not happy about getting the divorce and this unhappiness hampered 
his ability to make decisions during the case and colored his 
expectations. F & A performed the services requested, but Mr. 
Layton did not pay. 
F & A, finally, was required to pursue collection of the 
amounts due and owing. Mr. Layton counterclaimed for return of all 
of the money paid to F & A. The firm has demonstrated beyond 
contention not only that it earned the money paid by Mr. Layton, 
but also, that it provided services having a value substantially 
exceeding the amount paid. Mr. Layton has provided no legitimate 
defense for his failure to pay. The judgment entered against F & 
A results in the requirement that F & A provide $4,000.00 in 
services and costs to Mr. Layton for free because it made a mistake 
and missed a pretrial conference. Certainly, other sanctions were 
available and could have remedied any injury for F & A's failure to 
appear. 
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F & A admits that a mistake was made and that the mistake 
should not have occurred. F & A had devised procedures and systems 
to avoid just such an event. Yet, it did happen. Luckily, the 
mistake did not expose a client to an unjust result. It did 
inequitably effect F & A, however. In its Brief of Appellant, F & 
A explained in detail the procedures that have been taken to 
schedule and calendar all important dates. Due to circumstances 
outside of its control, F & A had been subject to an extreme change 
in staff. F & A is not asserting, contrary to Mr. Layton's 
accusations, that it should not be held responsible for the 
performance of its employees. F & A has provided substantial 
evidence that a mistake was made, a mistake that F & A had believed 
it had done everything possible to avoid. 
In addition, sanctions other than entry of default were 
available to the Court. F & A could have been ordered to pay for 
Xlr. Layton's time or travel expense, or some other sanction could 
lave been entered to compensate Mr. Layton for the mistake made by 
? & A, but a sanction that would be less Draconian under the 
circumstances. Certainly, F & A has attended many pretrials where 
:he other party has failed to appear, or where the Court has 
contacted by telephone the opposing party or counsel to obtain 
Lppearance. F & A is not suggesting that a Court has an obligation 
.o remind parties of their responsibility to appear at hearings, 
owever, in these other pretrials, no default or other sanction was 
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entered against the non- or late appearing party. The Court simply 
set dates, rescheduled the pretrial, or waited for the appearance 
of the party after the telephone contact. F & A regrets making the 
mistake, however, the degree of sanction is unjust. The firm 
should be allowed to proceed to the merits of its claims. 
Brenda L. Flanders, the principal of F & A, has been 
practicing law for fourteen (14) years. During this time, she has 
handled thousands of cases, almost always without incident. During 
the fourteen years, however, she has made a couple of mistakes. 
Attorneys are human, they make mistakes and there is no legal 
justification for holding an attorney to a different standard under 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Where a reasonable 
excuse is offered by the judgment debtor, courts generally tend to 
favor granting relief from judgment unless it appears that to do so 
would result in substantial injustice to the judgment creditor. 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen, Contractor, 54 4 
P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). 
F & A has offered a reasonable excuse. The entry of judgment 
under these circumstances is inequitable and unjust. "[I]t is 
quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to 
vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification 
or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely 
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application is made to set it aside." Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite 
Co., 376 P.2d 951, 14 Utah 2d 52 (Utah 1962). 
This Court of Appeals should reverse the trial court and 
remand this case to proceed on the merits. 
ARGUMENT II 
F & A HAS MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 60(b), 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a 
motion to set aside must be filed not more than three (3) months 
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. F 
& A complied with the requirement of Rule 60(b) by filing its 
motion within approximately two (2) months after the judgment 
purportedly was entered. 
Excusable neglect and mistake are present in this case. 
Throughout the proceedings, F & A has responded promptly and 
punctually. F & A initiated this lawsuit and has a greater 
economic interest in this case as opposed to Mr. Layton. The 
Complaint filed by F & A should not have been stricken. F & A 
filed a reply to Mr. Layton*s Counterclaim. In fact, it even filed 
i Certificate of Readiness for Trial, however, Mr. Layton had filed 
m objection thereto and a request for the Court to stay all 
>roceedings. F & A reasonably believed that the Court would 
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respond to Mr. Layton's request to stay the proceedings prior to 
; ii ly I:i irther j\ id i e:i a] an : I i i I .} T l i< ; \ • 2c i I 1 u >wever, i not respond 
to Mr. Layton's request. F & A was prepared to proceed to trial 
and would have attended the pre-trial conference if it had been 
calendared. MM f ,o-+,m ^  P i n 11, , I- >• . .1 , onf^repre was not 
calendared due to a mistake JJ> I ;a: mistake arose from the 
substantial staff changes that have occurred rt r :., within the 
last F & 
A diligently had attemptea ^o avoid any such mistakes. The changes 
i n staff included the loss . ' 'he of! ;ce manager, who had worked 
£ o r F & A f o r approximate 1 , f \ ,* -.. . 1 f (r » \ y p a r ^ •» 0 
was the principal involu.^ calendar^,.] events as notice was 
received. In addition, approximately one month later, F & A 
lost the secretary who also had been working on these matters. F 
111I tiake action to avoid any mistakes in calendaring. The firm 
holds weekly scheduling meetings and attempts to calendar all 
hearings, motions, responses to pleadings and the like. Further, 
as pleadings and correspondence are received by the firm, copies 
are made and delivered to the attorney responsible for the matter. 
Somehow, the date for the pretrial hearing inadvertently was not 
sell: leduled : 1: 1 tl le appr opi: iate calei idars. Considering the effort 
made by I & A to avoid such a mistake, and the reason for its 
occurrence, the failure to attend the pretrial hearing should have 
been :i : 1 1] eel as € excusable 1 leglect, i 1 ladvertence and/or mistake to 
come within Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
7 
F & A has a meritorious defense to the Counterclaim filed by 
Mr. Layton and has a meritorious claim against Mr. Layton regarding 
payment for services rendered and costs incurred on his behalf. F 
& A provided appropriate and responsive legal services on behalf of 
Mr. Layton. The judgment against F & A was rendered on the basis 
of a claim that F & A was unjustly enriched by all of the money 
paid by Mr. Layton. The evidence in the record totally negates 
this claim. F & A provided services to Mr. Layton having a value 
exceeding $4,000.00, including the costs advanced on behalf of Mr. 
Layton. Mr. Layton entered into a contract whereby he agreed to 
pay for the services rendered and the costs advanced. He cannot 
demonstrate that F & A provided nothing of value to him. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE MADE FINDINGS 
ON ALL MATERIAL ISSUES 
On December 15, 1995, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, Third 
Judicial Circuit Court Judge, denied the Motion to Set Aside 
rudgment filed by F & A. The Court entered a Disposition Summary 
lenying the Motion to Set Aside. The law is well settled that it 
Ls the duty of the trial judge in contested cases to find facts 
lpon all material issues submitted for decision unless findings are 
waived. Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). The 
:ourt did not make any findings and did not request counsel to 
submit findings to aid the court in making the necessary findings 
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for this case. No findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
required by Rule 52(.* " -: lules of Civil Procedure, were entered 
by the court. Acton Deliran Co., 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 
1987) Contrary to the assertions of Mr. Layton, F & A did not 
waive the requirement tha t the "Coi irt make such findings and 
conclusions. F & A cli d not default i i I :i ts Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment, and therefore, the requirement of entry of Findings and 
Conclusions continues, and has not been satisfied by the trial 
court. 
Further, a judgment war; entered aqairtf't i'1 A, 4. This judgment 
dealt with the merits of the case* It is extremely difficult for 
Flanders & Associates to challenge a judgment en the merits without 
having the basis for the judgment i i i i; J i::l ti ng. Conseqi lent] y, the 
Court should have provided findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Failure of the trial court tu lucu^ e tinamg 1 material 
issues is reversible error unlp^s thp facts i :ae record are 
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in 
favor of the judgmen4 " Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P. 2d 233, 236 (Utah 
1983). s M ; t show that the 
court's judgment or decree "follows logically from and is supported 
the evidence." Smith ^^thf 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). 
' ' i y cle I::a:i led ai id include enough 
subsidiary facts disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
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conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Rucker v. Dalton, 
598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
ARGUMENT IV 
MR. LAYTON IS NOT ENTITLED TO SANCTIONS 
UNDER RULE 33, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
This appeal is grounded in fact and law. F & A made a mistake 
and legitimately asserts that it comes within the confines and 
purpose of Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Certainly, 
? & A is not doing anything to harass Mr. Layton. The law does not 
support the contentions of Mr. Layton that Rule 60(b) is not 
ipplicable because F & A is a law firm. Sanctions against F & A 
mder Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, are not 
tppropriate in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
F & A has offered a "reasonable justification or excuse for 
its] failure to appear" and has made timely application to set 
ide the judgment. It has satisfied the requirements of Rule 
0(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It was an abuse of 
iscretion for the trial court to refuse to set aside the judgment. 
ayhew, 376 P. 2d 951. To allow Mr. Layton to obtain judgment 
gainst F & A without F & A having an opportunity to defend the 
stion constitutes an injustice that should not be allowed by this 
Durt. 
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WHEREFORE, F & A respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
t:l u \ d = w 1. i i Il  ill: I .1 J 1 1 >1 i u 1 1 .< S c \ t A s. i dc 1 i ldgment, remand this case 
for further proceedings, and grant such further relief as the Court 
deems just and proper. 
DATED this ~3Q day of July, 1996. 
L~L. EJande? 
diiq_E^Q--&e 
Brenda 
^Appaarix g :=| 
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